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THE BATTLE OF OLUSTEE:
ITS MEANING FOR THE BRITISH
by Lawrence E. Breeze
FEBRUARY 1864, Major General Quincy A. Gillmore,
commanding the Federal Department of the South with headquarters at Hilton Head, South Carolina, ordered Brigadier General Truman Seymour, commander of the District of Hilton Head,
to prepare his forces for a seaborne expedition. 1 Subsequent orders, issued after the embarkation of the troops, directed the expedition to the east coast of Florida. 2 On February 7, Seymour’s
forces reached the mouth of the St. Johns River. They ascended
the river to Jacksonville and soon took possession of the town. 3
Meeting only token resistance in the area, they began raiding
operations outward from Jacksonville. 4 As advance units of the
Federal forces pushed toward the interior of the state, Brigadier
General Joseph Finegan, the Confederate commander in East
Florida, was gathering forces at Lake City approximately sixty
miles west of Jacksonville. On February 13, the Confederates
took up a position near Olustee, a village thirteen miles east of
Lake City, and threw up field works. Finegan considered it the
strongest position between Lake City and the Federal forces at
Barber’s plantation [Lawtey] on the St. Marys River. 5 It was on
firm ground in an area that otherwise was dotted with ponds and
swamps and through it ran the roadway from Jacksonville to Lake
City and the railroad from Jacksonville to Tallahassee. During
the next few days, Finegan received reinforcements from General
P. G. T. Beauregard, commander of the Confederate Department
of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. 6 These units came largely
from Georgia and South Carolina and increased the Confederate
ARLY IN

1. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records
of the Union and Confederate Armies, 69 vols. (Washington, 18801901), Series I, Vol. XXXV, pt. 1, 280. (Cited hereafter as O.R.)
2. Ibid., 280-281.
3. William Watson Davis, The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida (New York, 1913), 276-277; Mark F. Boyd, “The Federal Campaign of 1864 in East Florida,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XXIX
(July 1950), 7.
4. Davis, 277-278; Boyd, 7.
5. O.R., Series I, Vol. XXXV, pt. 1, 330-333.
6. Ibid., 110-111, 331.
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force to approximately 5,000 men. The cautious, even hesitant,
nature of the Federal advance had facilitated the southern buildup in the area of Olustee.
On the morning of February 20, the main body of Union
troops, amounting to 5,500 men, began an advance from Barber’s
plantation toward Lake City, intending to cut railroad communications between East and West Florida at the Suwannee River. 7
Shortly after mid-day the Federal advance cavalry encountered
the Confederate outposts, and by mid-afternoon the opposing
forces were locked in deadly combat. 8 The battle site was some
three miles in advance of the Confederate defensive works at
Olustee.
By nightfall the Federals had been beaten badly and Seymour
ordered a withdrawal. 9 The retreat continued until Union forces
reached Jacksonville. On February 23, General Gillmore reported
to General Halleck, General-in-Chief, United States Army, that
the enemy had thrown such a large force into Florida that it was
inexpedient to attempt to do more than hold the line at the St.
Johns River. 10
Olustee was a bloody battle. The Confederates reported a total
of 946 casualties, and General Seymour reported nearly twice
that number - 1,861. 11 Olustee brought the Federal invasion
of Florida to an abrupt and disastrous conclusion. From the Confederate standpoint it was a timely victory, and it produced “general jubilation over the south.’’ 12 The purpose of this paper is to
examine the reaction of the Confederacy’s British friends and

7.
8.
9.
10.

Ibid., 288.
Ibid., 288-290, 330-333, 338-341; Davis, 286-292; Boyd, 17-27.
O.R., series I, Vol. XXXV, pt. 1, 289, 302, 305, 333.
Ibid., 291. After the war, Gillmore reported (Ibid., 290-291) that
he learned later there had been no “disparity in numbers” at Olustee.
The Confederates greatly overestimated the size of Union forces at
Olustee. Ibid., 339.
11. Ibid., 298, 337. These figures included killed, wounded, and missing.
12. Boyd, 31; O.R., Series I, Vol. XXXV, pt. 1, 338. The Confederate
Congress prepared a resolution of thanks to Finegan and his men,
and Beauregard congratulated Finegan on a “brilliant victory” and
described it as a “timely success.” In view of the dearth of Confederate victories at this point in the war, it was probably an apt
description. Clement Eaton, A History of the Southern Confederacy
(New York, 1954), 285, says that Olustee “gave the people of the
Confederacy a gleam of hope in the dark gloom following the disaster
of Missionary Ridge.”
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supporters as expressed in some organs of the British press. 13 In
order best to understand their response to Olustee some background information will be helpful.
For nearly three years the British had followed the American
struggle with lively interest, but, by 1864, this interest began to
wane. Several reasons may be offered to account for this. For
one thing, many Englishmen thought that the war would continue
indefinitely, consuming men and resources, with no decision in
sight.
More important were European developments that drew English attention away from America. The outbreak of a rebellion in
Russian Poland in 1863, fanned the latent fire of Russophobia in
Britain and crowded American news from the papers. 14 Of even
greater concern was the war between Denmark and the German
states that appeared so threatening to the general peace and to
Britain’s position in European affairs, that alongside it American
events paled into insignificance. 15
Moreover, the elements that favored the political status quo
in Britain had tried, from the very outset of the American war, to
focus attention on the alleged breakdown of American democratic
institutions as a warning against parliamentary reform and the
extension of the franchise to the British working class. 16 This attempt to make the American Civil War serve domestic political
13. Publications used in this paper include the London Times, the Manchester Guardian, and two weeklies published in (London, the Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art and the Index.
The Index was a Confederate-British journal established in the
spring of 1862, with the announced purpose of advocating the “cause
of the Southern Union,” but it also served the anti-democratic cause
in Britain.
1 4 . L a w r e n c e E . B r e e z e , “British Opinion of Russian Foreign Policy,
1841-1871’’ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri,
1960), 280-307.
15. Ibid., 308-311; London Times, March 22, 1864, referred to the
Danish war and the prolongation of the American conflict as contributing factors to the decline of interest in the war in America.
16. See for example the Saturday Review, XII (April 27, 1861), 407,
and July 20, 1861), 55; Blackwood’s Magazine, XC (July 1861),
125-126, and (October 1861), 395-405; Manchester Guardian,
August 10, September 10, 1861; London Times, August 5, 12, 26,
September 2, 4, 1861; Quarterly Review, CX (July 1861), 247288. For unsuccessful attempts to inject the “American example”
into the debates of the House of Commons, see Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, third series, CLXII (1861), cols. 383-384, Stephen
Cave’s speech of April 10, 1861, and CLXIII (1861), col. 134, Sir
John Ramsden’s speech of May 27, 1861.
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purposes had aligned much of the press on the side of the Confederacy. At the same time it had prompted a spirited counterattack by anti-slavery forces and admirers of American democracy. Before the end of 1863, the success of this counterattack,
evidenced by the growing community of interest between middle
class reformers and the working classes and expressed in the resolutions emanating from. numerous public meetings, raised doubts
as to the further usefulness of the “American example” to the
cause of British conservatism. 17 Nor had military events in
America, in the latter part of 1863, provoked much enthusiasm
among the Confederacy’s British supporters. The new year did
not produce any military activity that attracted attention.
Such was the situation when information of a battle along the
Jacksonville and Tallahassee railroad reached Britain. In 1864,
it took several days for news from America to cross the Atlantic.
It was February 25 before British readers learned that a Federal
force of some size had arrived at Jacksonville. 18 Subsequent mails
brought scattered information about the Federal advance in Florida, such as the capture of Baldwin, the rail junction twenty miles
1 9
On March 12, the first news of the repulse
west of Jacksonville.
at Olustee appeared in The Times of London and the Manchester
Guardian. 20 The interest and spirits of Confederate sympathizers
2 1
The victory not only had cost the Federals
immediately rose.
dearly in men and prestige, but it also forced them back to the
For examples of the success of the counterattack see George M.
Trevelyan, The Life of John Bright (Boston, 1913), 306 ff.; Frances
Edna Gillespie, Labor and Politics in England, 1850-1867 (Durham,
1927), 214-216; Martin B. Duberman, Charles Francis Adams,
1 8 0 7 - 1 8 8 6 (Boston, 1961), 299-300; Worthington Chauncey Ford
(ed.), A. Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861-1865, 2 vols. (New York,
1920), I, 243-244; R. A. J. Walling (ed.), The Diaries of John
Bright (London, 1930), 263; E. D. Adams, Great Britain and the
American Civil War, 2 vols. (New York, 1924), II, 291-294. It
is quite noticeable that beginning in mid-1863, many spokesmen for
conservatism began to talk less and less of the political lessons to
be drawn from the American conflict.
18. London Times, February 25, 1864.
19. Ibid., March 1, 1864, considered the news from Florida unimportant;
ibid., March 5, 1864, reported the capture of Baldwin; ibid., March
7, 1864; Manchester Guardian, March 7, 1864.
20. L o n d o n T i m e s , M a r c h 1 2 , 1 8 6 4 , t h e n e w s h a d b e e n s e n t b y t h e
paper’s New York correspondent on February 27; Manchester Guardian, March 12, 1864.
21. London Times, March 14, 1864; Manchester Guardian, March 14,
1 8 6 4 ; Index, IV (March 17, 1864), 161, 168; Saturday Review,
XVII (March 19, 1864), 337-338.
17.
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coastal areas around Jacksonville, Fernandina, and St. Augustine.
Never again would they threaten the interior of Florida.
When Union forces secured control of the Mississippi in
1863, they deprived the Confederacy of valuable food supplies
from the West. As the supply situation became more serious,
Florida’s importance to the South increased. Reports from Confederate commissary officers, near the end of 1863, offered abundant testimony to the growing dependence of southern armies
upon Florida for food resources, especially meat. 22 In explaining
his reasons for the invasion of Florida and his plan to occupy the
richest portions of the area lying between the Suwannee and St.
Johns rivers, General Gillmore, in a communication to General
Halleck, dated January 31, had given as two of his objectives the
acquisition of an outlet for cotton, lumber, timber, turpentine,
and other Florida products, and the severance of one of the major
Confederate sources of commissary supplies. 23 In elaborating
upon the second of these objectives, General Gillmore explained
that the Confederacy had come to rely largely upon Florida for
beef and pork and that the enemy had plans to improve rail transportation into Georgia in order to expedite the movement of supplies to the Confederate armies. Consequently, Federal failure
to cut this important supply line should have been a source of
great satisfaction to Confederate sympathizers in Britain.
But while these English friends were delighted with the outcome of Olustee, and one enthusiastic writer even described the
battle as the most crushing and humiliating defeat since Bull Run
and Ball’s Bluff, 24 they failed to see any real significance in it.
In British eyes, Florida lay outside the area of significant military
operations, 25 and there is no indication of British appreciation that
this very isolation enabled Florida to play a vital role in supplying
the Confederacy with badly needed supplies.
It is necessary to look elsewhere to find reasons for British
interest in the Florida campaign. A look at their press treatment
suggests that the military expedition had been undertaken solely
for political purposes. Some English writers charged that President
22. Davis, 268-271.
23. O.R., Series I, Vol. XXXV, pt. 1, 279. A third named objective was
the recruitment of Negro troops.
24. Index, IV (March 31, 1864), 1931.
25. See for example the editorial in the Manchester Guardian, March
2 9 , 1 8 6 4 ; Saturday Review, XVII (March 19, 1864), 337.
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Lincoln had personally ordered the invasion with the aim of “reconstructing” a loyal government in Florida, manufacturing three
“sham” electoral votes, thereby assisting with his renomination and
re-election to the presidency. 2 6 These publications were taking a
cue from the segment of the American press that continually
assailed Lincoln, accusing him of sacrificing men in an electioneering campaign in Florida. Certainly the British press was
familiar with the position of the New York papers; the articles
written by the London Times’ New York correspondent echoed the
line of Lincoln’s detractors in America.
But it is more likely that some English conservatives arrived
at this conclusion without resorting to transatlantic assistance.
British conservatism neither understood Lincoln’s conception of
the Union nor appreciated his dedication to its restoration. On
December 8, 1863, Lincoln had issued his ten per cent plan for
the reconstruction of the United States. 27 Upon learning of the
plan, the editor of the Manchester Guardian, without acknowledging the possibility that above all else Lincoln might desire the
restoration of the secession states to their proper relationship with
the Union, promptly labeled it a device to insure the Republicans
enough electoral votes to win the next presidential election. 25
The editor went on to suggest that Louisiana and Tennessee were
likely subjects for the application of the “constitutional fiction”
designed to secure the re-election of Lincoln.
In the early part of 1864, Britishers were reading, especially
in articles written by the London Times' New York correspondent,
that much dissatisfaction with Lincoln existed within his own
party, that other names were being mentioned as candidates, and
that very likely the Democrats would nominate a strong candidate,
probably General George McClellan. 29 In a portion of the press,
an image began to take shape - that of a president determined to
use any means to meet the challenge to his position. Attention
was directed to Louisiana where General Nathaniel P. Banks had
set in motion machinery for elections in late February 1864. According to the London Times, this was the first step in an attempt
26. Index, IV (March 17, 1864), 161; Ibid. (March 24, 1864), 178;
London Times, March 17, 1864; Saturday Review, XVII (March 19,
1864), 337.
27. Bureau of National Literature (comp.), Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, 11 vols., (New York, 1897-1917), 3414-3416.
28. Manchester Guardian, December 21, 1863.
29. London Times, January 25, February 2 and 22, 1864.
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to manufacture electoral votes in that state for Lincoln. 30 The
same newspaper carried brief news items to the effect that enough
Arkansas Unionists had been found to warrant preparations, directed by General Frederick Steele, for elections. 31
Thus, through a word here and an article there, the way was
prepared for a political interpretation of the Florida campaign.
Certain factors surrounding the campaign itself lent credence to
this view. There is little doubt that in addition to General Gillmore’s plan to sever the Confederate supply lines from Florida, a
further objective was the inauguration of measures to “reconstruct” Florida in accordance with instructions received from Lincoln through Major John Hay, his private secretary. 32 Although
the British did not have knowledge of this communication, they
did know, as early as March 7, of General Gillmore’s official invitation to the “Loyal people, and such as desire to become so under the provisions of the President’s proclamation of December 8,
1863, who are now absent from their homes in East Florida, to
return there and resume their usual avocations. It is the intention
of the United States Government, and wholly within its power,
to afford all needful protection.” 33
In addition, the British knew that Major Hay had accompanied the Federal invading force. Soon after his arrival in Jacksonville, Hay began posting copies of Lincoln’s proclamation of
December 8. He spent several days in the area, hearing and recording oaths of allegiance and issuing certificates entitling the
bearer to the benefits of the proclamation. 34
It appeared to some English writers that the scanty population of Florida had offered an easy and tempting target for the
application of the president’s scheme of reconstruction. If Gener30. Ibid., February 4, March 7, 1864.
31. Ibid., February 1, 6, 12, 1864. On February 16, the paper’s New
York correspondent reported that preparations were underway to
reconstruct Tennessee.
32. O.R., Series I, Vol. XXXV, pt. 1, 279; see 278 for Lincoln’s message
to Gillmore, January 13, 1864, which began as follows: “I understand an effort is being made by some worthy gentlemen to reconstruct a loyal State government in Florida.” See Davis, 272-275, for
a discussion of the Unionist movement in Florida and especially the
activities of L. D. Stickney of St. Augustine who held a position as
Federal Tax Commissioner.
33. Manchester Guardian, March 7, 1864, reprinted this notice as it
appeared in the New York Times, February 20, 1864.
34. Tyler Dennett (ed.), Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and
Letters of John Hay (New York, 1939), 159-165.
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al Seymour could maintain himself in middle Florida for even a
short time, he might collect enough Unionists to equal one-tenth
of the population. It would then be easy to hold a convention,
dictate a constitution, and secure the nomination of electors pledged
to Lincoln. 35 These writers saw no other Union advantage to be
gained by the campaign. Some were ready to believe that Lincoln
had ordered the expedition without consulting either the Secretary
of War or his military advisors. They heaped abuse on a president
who would sacrifice so many lives and so much money in such an
indecent scheme.
The victory of the Confederates at Olustee brought jubilation
to their British friends because to them it spoiled Lincoln’s political game. Even if Union forces should retain their hold on some
coastal towns, the British felt they would be unable to “reconstruct” the state. Olustee spelled disaster for Federal plans, or so
it seemed to many Englishmen.
Since only a small congressional delegation and three electoral votes were involved, it might be asked why Federal failure
should be such a source of satisfaction. In view of the progress of northern arms elsewhere in the South and the successful application of the reconstruction formula in some states, any
reversal of fortune was welcome to Confederate sympathizers
abroad. More important than depriving Lincoln of three electoral
votes, which might not be essential to his re-election anyway, were
the ramifications of the Florida campaign. Lincoln’s northern
enemies used the unsuccessful expedition with great force in attacking him. Anti-administration newspapers openly claimed that
he had launched a costly military expedition to further his own
36
Many believed it was because of this
selfish political ambitions.
that the United States Senate, on March 2, adopted a resolution
directing the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War to inquire into the origins, purposes, and results of the Florida military
expedition.
35. Saturday Review, XVII (March 19, 1864), 337; London Times,
March 17, 1864; Index, IV (March 17, 1864), 161, and (March
24, 1864), 178.
36. Dennett, 165. Hay made the following notation in his diary: “28th
Feb. Sunday. The A r a g o came in this morning. The papers of the
23rd and 24th attack my coming here as a political trick. Q.A.G.
[General Gillmore] is much troubled by it.” Davis, 293-294.
37. O.R., Series I, Vol. XXXV pt. 1, 292. This was reported by the
Manchester Guardian, March 18, 1864.
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These repercussions in the North were taken as a hopeful sign
by some British conservatives. In warning against electoral reform
at home, they long had pointed to Lincoln as an example of the
type of unqualified and ill-suited man likely to rise to power in a
democracy. Since Lincoln’s honesty had been an important point
of popular belief, some of his British critics hopefully believed
that confidence in him had been shaken by the charge that he had
interfered in the management of the war for partisan political
purposes. 38 The knowledge that the disaster at Olustee had provoked the Senate to take some action was encouraging to these
foes of democracy. 39 This loss of popularity and confidence,
coupled with a new call for 200,000 fresh troops by a leader who
had just demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice lives for votes,
might prepare the way for the reception of a peace party. 40
Many Britishers believed that if Lincoln remained in power,
the war would last indefinitely. We would continue to ask for the
sacrifice of more men until at long last the South lay prostrate
before him. On the other hand, a Democratic candidate, or even
another more flexible Republican, might bring the war to a close
and do so on terms that recognized the permanent division of the
United States. Some Englishmen wanted this out of genuine sympathy for the Confederacy; others thought primarily of the advantages to Britain if two republics replaced the single, dynamic,
rapid-growing United States.
There was still another factor motivating some conservative
organs of the British press. These foes of democracy had, at the
very outset of the American crisis, interpreted disunion as the
failure of democracy. It is true that the “American example” had
lost some of its usefulness by 1864, and many British conservatives had laid the prestige of their political doctrine on the
line with the fate of the Confederacy. Reunion in America
would leave the position of the anti-reforming elements in Britain
more vulnerable than ever to the demands of the working class
for an extension of the franchise and other democratic measures.
It had become obvious by 1864, that foreign governments,
including Britain, would not intervene to break the blockade, ex38. London Times, March 30, 1864.
39. Saturday Review, XVII (March 19, 1864), 337.
40. London Times, March 22, 30, 1864.
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tend recognition, or take any other step that might assist the South
in its struggle. And from the way the war had gone since Vicksburg, Gettysburg, and Missionary Ridge, the long range military
picture did not look bright. The best chance of averting the reunion so dreaded by British conservatism lay in a change of attitude by the North. If Unionists should sicken of the blood-letting,
tire of the repeated demands for more men for the slaughter, and
become disenchanted with Abraham Lincoln’s leadership, they
might refuse further support of the war and let the South go its
way without further hindrance. British supporters of the Confederacy did not expect that the disastrous and discredited Florida
campaign would of itself produce this desired result, but it could
be a start in that direction. Because it offered such a possibility,
fleeting though it turned out to be, the battle of Olustee occupied
an important, though brief, place in the treatment of the American war by the British press.
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